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4.1  Introduction 
We are interested in the evolution of the civil service system as an institution 
for governing the employment and administration of the federal civilian labor 
force. In chapters 2 and 3,  we emphasized the incentives that federal politicians 
had to change the process by  which government employees were hired from 
purely patronage to a merit system. The process of institutional change, initi- 
ated by the president and the Congress in the creation of the classified service 
in 1883, however, changed relative prices in ways that affected the subsequent 
debelopment of the civil service system.' In particular, the establishment of the 
merit service raised the benefits and lowered the costs to federal employees of 
organizing  into labor unions. As such, federal employee unions and related 
lobby groups became a third party with an important stake in the further devel- 
opment  of  the  civil  service  system. The classified  service  became  a  well- 
defined, distinct group among federal employees. These employees were hired 
and promoted on the basis of merit, and, as their positions became more per- 
manent than they had been under patronage, they had a greater interest in or- 
ganizing to ensure that the terms of  the federal labor contract were to their 
benefit. Under the civil service system, it became easier for federal employees 
to organize. Where under patronage federal workers had identified with their 
political mentors and hence were fragmented, under the classified service they 
began to identify themselves as a distinct and more unified group. This facili- 
tated the successful formation of federal employee unions, which could lobby 
Congress for legislative adjustments to the civil service system. 
The rise of federal workers as a party interested in the institutional develop- 
ment of the civil service system suggests that the system would gradually as- 
sume attributes other than those strictly desired by the president and the Con- 
gress2  This element is overlooked in much of the current literature concerning 
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the development of the civil service system. The role played by federal workers 
in the design of their own compensation systems and personnel rules is either 
ignored or, if acknowledged, portrayed as having had force only after President 
Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988 in 1962, which allowed unions limited 
collective-bargaining rights (see Levitan and Noden 1983; Freeman 1986). We 
believe, however, that federal employees were critical in the earlier develop- 
ment of the civil service system and that, without incorporating them as a third 
bargaining party in  institutional change, the evolution of  the system cannot 
adequately  be  explained.  These  issues  are  examined  in  this  and  the  next 
chapter. 
4.2  The Rise of Federal Employee Labor Unions 
Prior to the 188Os, the federal labor movement was splintered and limited. 
With civilian employment based on patronage appointments, job tenure was 
short, and federal workers owed allegiance to their mentors. As a consequence, 
there was little shared sense of collective interests among federal workers. Un- 
der  these  conditions,  there  was  no  significant  organized  labor  movement 
among the federal government’s employees, and federal labor unions were vir- 
tually nonexistent (Nesbitt 1976, 3-80).  Conditions began to change with the 
growth of the classified civil service after 1883. The growing interest among 
federal workers in forming labor unions after the Pendleton Act was passed 
was commented on by Sterling Spero, an early student of federal labor unions: 
“Gradually, as the patronage of  these lower positions disappeared, Congress- 
men and politicians generally began to lose interest in the post office clerks 
and carriers, and these workers, thus thrown to their resources, soon found it 
necessary  to unite among themselves in order to protect their interests and 
improve their lot. Besides, with their positions now made ‘permanent’, postal 
employees saw that they had a stake in the service and in good working condi- 
tions which they had not had before. Previously a man was in a government 
job one year and out of it the next, and it did not make very much difference if 
working conditions did leave much to be desired. But now these men began to 
feel that they were in the service to stay. . . . The organized movement among 
postal workers was the natural outcome of this changed situation” (1927,61). 
Indeed, one of the earliest efforts of organized civil service employees was 
to strengthen and expand their newly acquired independence through the merit 
system. The Nationai Association of All Civil Service Employees was formed 
in 1896 to promote the extension of the classified service and additional civil 
service reform, such as the adoption of grievance procedures and the granting 
of greater job security (Spero 1927, 61).3  At the association’s first convention, a 
resolution was passed emphasizing that “the employees of the Classified Civil 
Service . . . do not . . . owe any duty to any political party, nor to any political 
leader. They are in no sense the private employees of any officer of the Govern- 
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changes in civil service rules after 1896 led to tension between the organization 
and the U.S. Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission was 
appointed by  the president under the provisions of  the Pendleton Act to de- 
velop and administer civil service rules. The emerging differences between the 
commission and the association reflected the newly separate interests of the 
president  and  the  Congress,  on  the  one hand,  who  were  responsible  for 
the creation of  the merit system, and the recently organized group of  classi- 
fied employees, on the other. 
With the assistance of private-sector labor unions, such as the Knights of 
Labor in the late nineteenth century and the American Federation of Labor in 
the twentieth, classified employees began to form more traditional unions that 
also lobbied Congress for legislation regarding job classification and security, 
salaries, hours of  work, workers’ compensation, and retirement benefits. As 
the civil service share of  federal employees grew and union membership ex- 
panded, federal unions, with the assistance of organized labor, became influ- 
ential in obtaining new laws setting salaries and in designing administrative 
rules affecting working  condition^.^ Federal unions opened their headquarters 
in Washington, D.C.: they drafted laws for the classified service, carefully fol- 
lowed legislation that affected them, and appeared at committee hearings to 
advocate or oppose bills; they gave testimonial dinners for congressional sup- 
porters, issued honorary union memberships, and had influential members of 
Congress, especially the chair of  the Civil Service Committee, address their 
national conventions. Federal unions also became active in political campaigns 
to promote their supporters and oppose their adversaries. 
As  the  classified  service grew  in  the  twentieth  century, the  unions  that 
formed were general ones, such as the National Federation of Federal Employ- 
ees (NFFE), organized in 1917, and the American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE), organized in 1932, both affiliated with the American Fed- 
eration of Labor (AFL). Most of the early unions, however, were more nar- 
rowly focused, involving postal workers, the largest group of federal employ- 
ees.  For  example,  in  1891,  63 percent  of  all  executive  branch  civilian 
employees worked for the Post Office De~artment.~  Local assemblies of letter 
carriers were established through the Knights of Labor in New York, Chicago, 
and other cities in the late 1880s. In 1890, the National Association of Letter 
Carriers and  the  National  Association  of  Post  Office  Clerks were  formed 
(Perlman and Taft 1935, 163-65).  Railway postal clerks organized nationally 
in  1891 as the Railway Mail Association. Other federal unions included the 
National Federation of Post Office Clerks, organized and chartered by the AFL 
in 1906, and the more radical Brotherhood of Railway Postal Clerks that was 
formed in 191  1. Union membership grew after 1912 and the enactment of the 
Lloyd-LaFollette Act, which removed potential penalties for belonging to la- 
bor unions.  Spero (1927, 45) estimated  that by  1920 there were some fifty 
federal employee unions affiliated with the AFL and that between 50 and 60 
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The Lloyd-LaFollette Act (37 Stat. 539) was passed during conflict between 
the Post Office Department and federal postal unions over pay legislation that 
was under consideration  in Congress. The conflict between the  Post Office 
Department and the postal unions, as well as related efforts of the unions to 
influence other legislation in the early twentieth century, illustrates the growing 
role of federal employees in defining the structure of the civil service system. 
After  1900, a variety of  issues, ranging from salaries, hours of  work, and 
pension provisions to actions for improving productivity, were raised by the 
postal unions and the Post Office Department. In general, the department was 
hostile to the new employee unions, and it often took a strong stand in opposing 
their lobbying efforts. The official view was that government workers were to 
be like soldiers and be independent of unions. As early as 1895, the Post Office 
Department attempted to limit the activities of postal employees to influence 
legislation. Postmaster General William L. Wilson issued the order “that here- 
after no Postmaster, Post-office Clerk, Letter Carrier, Railway Postal Clerk, or 
other postal employee, shall visit Washington, whether on leave with or with- 
out pay, for the purpose of influencing legislation before Congress” (quoted in 
Spero 1927, 85-86). The penalty for violation was dismissal. 
By the turn of the century, postal salaries had declined in real terms, and 
various bills were under consideration in Congress for reclassifying positions 
and raising salaries. The legislation was, however, opposed by the Post Office 
Department and the chair of the House Post Office Committee, Representative 
Eugene  Loud of  California.  Following  intensive  lobbying efforts by  postal 
unions for the legislation, President Roosevelt issued the first of his gag orders 
on 31  January  1902, forbidding  lobbying  activity  on pay  or related  issues, 
again with penalty of dismissal (Spero 1927, 97). The postal unions opposed 
the gag order, and the president’s intervention offended Congress. Additionally, 
the unions organized an election campaign against Congressman Loud, whose 
committee position gave him virtual veto authority over any postal legislation. 
The postal unions, along with help from the AFL, were successful in contribut- 
ing to Loud’s defeat in the 1902 election (Spero 1927,99). This demonstration 
of political muscle could not have been overlooked by other members of Con- 
gress. The role of federal employees in the election was investigated by the 
U.S.  Civil Service Committee, which found that they had overstepped  civil 
service rules, but no disciplinary action was taken (Spero 1927, 100). 
The Post  Office  Department  continued  to resist  the  formation  of  postal 
unions and the influence that they attempted to exert on civil service work rules 
and salaries. In 1905, Postmaster General Cortelyou stated that labor organiza- 
tions would have the sanction of the department only if they had as their object 
“improvements in the service or [were] of a purely fraternal or beneficial char- 
acter. With any other purpose in view they are detrimental to the service, their 
members and the public” (quoted in Spero 1927, 110). Faced with opposition 
from the department and the president, the unions began to agitate against the 
gag orders to facilitate their access to Congress. President Roosevelt reacted 80  Chapter4 
by  changing the tenure rule put into place by  McKinley in 1897 in order to 
permit the removal of employees without notice. Under McKinley’s earlier ex- 
ecutive order, removals had required justification, notice, and an opportunity 
for employee response (U.S. Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1904, 
69-70).  President Roosevelt then reissued the gag order in January  1906 to 
reemphasize the restrictions on federal employee’s access to members of Con- 
gress. Under the presidential directive, all communication with Congress was 
to be through executive branch department or agency heads. 
With declining relative pay, labor turnover in  the Post Office Department 
rose in 1906 and 1907. The department responded with a reclassification bill, 
creating six salary grades for clerks and carriers with automatic promotions 
within the lower grades to raise salaries (Spero 1927, 114-15).h The National 
Association of  Letter Carriers demanded more, and the organization’s presi- 
dent, James Holland, traveled to Washington, D.C., to convince Congress to 
amend the bill with more favorable promotion and pay  provisions. The lob- 
bying by the carriers’ association was successful, and the Reclassification Act 
of 2 March 1907 (34 Stat. 1205) contained the promotion and salary schedule 
desired by  the union. Nevertheless, for ignoring the gag order, Holland was 
fired by  President Roosevelt as head  of  the Association of  Letter Carriers 
(Spero 1927, 115). 
Discontent with the gag orders and their restrictions on appeals to Congress 
continued to grow. On 26 November 1909, President Taft issued a new order 
as part of an efficiency and economy drive. The prohibition against responding 
to congressional requests for information was to be more strictly enforced, as 
evidenced by the dismissal of Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot for violation of 
the gag order. In  1911, the Brotherhood of Railway Postal Clerks was formed 
to carry the demands of postal workers to Congress more aggressively. As rela- 
tions deteriorated between the department and its unions, members were de- 
moted or dismissed. The AFL presented the legislation to Congress to limit the 
power of removal over civil service employees and to guarantee their right to 
organize labor unions that became the Lloyd-LaFollette Act (Spero 1927, 146, 
158-68). President Taft and executive branch department heads intensely op- 
posed the legislation, and Taft  modified the gag orders to make them more 
palatable. Even so, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Lloyd-LaFollette bill 
as an amendment to the Post Office Appropriations Act on 24 August 1912. 
The law prohibited removal of civil service employees, except for efficiency 
reasons, and required written notices and an opportunity for rebuttal. Under 
the new law, membership in labor unions was not to be a reason for reduction 
in pay or removal.’ 
In 1913, the new postmaster general Albert S.  Burleson continued to oppose 
unions and union interference in the administration of the Post Office Depart- 
ment. Cost-cutting measures were adopted, including a merit-demerit system, 
a reduction in the number of postal clerks, and adjustments in the way in which 
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fully attempted to contract out the rural mail service, a move that he argued 
would save the government $13 million a year. Postal unions were quick to 
respond by lobbying Congress to thwart the measure (Spero 1927, 201). Addi- 
tionally, when  Postmaster General Burleson  attempted to  have  the  Lloyd- 
LaFollette Act repealed in 1917, intense lobbying efforts by federal unions and 
the AFL led to the defeat of the repeal effort (Spero 1927, 213-28). 
Postal unions continued to pressure Congress for salary legislation despite 
opposition from the Post Office Department. The Postal Reclassification Act 
(41 Stat. 1045) was passed on 5 June 1920, and it defined a new series of salary 
grades (Spero 1927, 206-7).8 Later in 1924, to show its gratitude to Senator 
LaFollette, the National Federation of Post Office Clerks vigorously supported 
his presidential candidacy (Spero 1948, 47). The political actions of federal 
unions in mobilizing their members and furthering their interests were exem- 
plified by  the letter sent by W.  M. Collins, president of the Railway Mail Asso- 
ciation, to association members in 1932. The letter described how candidates 
had voted on issues affecting postal clerks and declared that it was “entirely 
proper” that  “you  should remember your  friends on  election day” (Spero 
1927,47-48). 
4.3  Changes in the Civil Service System in Response to Actions Taken 
by Federal Employee Groups 
4.3.1  Salaries 
As noted earlier, by  1900 federal employee salaries were declining in real 
terms relative to those earned by private-sector workers. Given the provisions 
of the Pendleton Act and the expanded coverage of federal workers under the 
merit system, this decline in salaries could be expected. Federal workers were 
becoming less valuable assets for members of Congress. 
Patronage workers had been an important source of campaign contributions 
for members of Congress, and, even after the enactment of the Pendleton Act, 
they could still make voluntary contributions. That act, however, forbade the 
levying of assessments on classified federal employees by politicians, and the 
Civil Service Commission investigated allegations of extortion and enforced 
this provision of the law. Since classified workers could no longer effectively 
be coerced into paying assessments, both the president and members of Con- 
gress had little incentive to maintain the relatively high salaries that had pre- 
viously compensated workers for making these contributions. 
Under nineteenth-century compensation arrangements for federal employ- 
ees, agency heads had considerable discretion in deciding where a particular 
worker would be pla~ed.~  The Pendleton Act did not distinguish between clas- 
sified and unclassified employees in terms of pay, and the basic compensation 
schedules remained unaltered by the law. There is no evidence that patronage 
or merit workers in similar positions received different pay. Recall that entire 82  Chapter4 
facilities were made eligible for merit coverage whenever employment reached 
the prescribed  limit  (initially fifty, later twenty). This procedure  meant  that 
individuals in comparable jobs but at different size facilities would be under 
patronage in one case and merit in another. When the share of patronage work- 
ers (those available for direct partisan manipulation and assessments for cam- 
paign  contributions) was large, Congress would desire to maintain relatively 
high pay  for federal workers; hence, average salaries would be high. As the 
share of patronage employees dropped, however, the desire within Congress to 
maintain those salaries would dissipate. Accordingly, as the share of classified 
workers increased, relative pay for federal employees would be expected to 
fall.'O In this section, we examine the available evidence regarding the pattern 
of federal salaries from the late nineteenth century through 1926. We also in- 
vestigate attempts by federal employee unions to raise pay levels. 
Available quantitative and qualitative  evidence from various sources indi- 
cates that, from 1883 through 1917 and the advent of World War I, the relative 
salary level of  federal employees fell. John R. Commons, (1935, 70) argued 
that the position  of federal employees deteriorated in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as nominal salaries remained generally constant but 
consumer prices rose, especially after 1910. He noted that nominal wages for 
postal employees were almost unchanged from 1895 to  1907 and that their 
purchasing power dropped by 26 percent during that period. Similarly, Spero 
(1927, 33, 96) discussed the lack of change in federal pay schedules and the 
fall in real incomes for postal employees after the turn of the century." 
It is possible to compare the patterns of federal and private pay, using data 
compiled by Paul Douglas (1930). Douglas provided average wages for various 
private-sector industries  and the  federal government  as well as the relative 
weights used for computing an all-industry average wage that includes federal 
government wages.12  Using these weights and individual industry data, we can 
calculate the average salaries for the private and government sectors. Table 4.1 
provides the relevant average wage data for the private sector and the federal 
government from 1900 through 1926 and the ratios between the two. 
The data in table 4.1 indicate that, between 1900 and 1917, nominal regular 
federal salaries rose by 25 percent, postal salaries by 30 percent, but private 
salaries by 63 percent. At the same time, however, the all-item CPI index rose 
by 54 percent (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975,211). Hence, government 
employees lost ground in real terms. The decline in their relative position is 
revealed by the ratios of federal to private pay. The comparatively better aver- 
age weekly salary position of federal employees compared with those in manu- 
facturing, coal mining, railroads, farming, and the building trades (the compo- 
nents of the private index) in 1900 is shown by the ratios of federal to private 
salaries in columns 4 and 5. Moving toward 1920, however, there is a notice- 
able fall in the size of the ratios. Federal employee salaries, in general, did not 
keep pace with increases in salaries elsewhere in the economy, particularly in 
the building trades, railways, coal mining, and man~facturing.'~  There was a 83  The Rise of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
Table 4.1  Federal GovernmenVPrivate-Sector Average Weekly Salaries, 
1900-1926 
Federal ($)”  Ratio Federal to Private 
Year  Regular  Postal  Sector ($)”  Regular  Postal 
Private 
~  ~ 
1900  19.87  17.79  11.57  1.72  1.54 
1901  20.13  18.00  11.75  1.71  1.54 
1902  20.40  17.96  12.18  I .67  1.47 
1903  20.52  17.85  12.66  1.62  1.41 
1904  20.50  17.90  12.79  1.60  I .40 
1905  20.62  17.98  12.97  I .59  1.39 
1906  20.85  17.71  13.47  1  .55  1.31 
1907  21.04  18.15  13.89  1.51  1.31 
1908  21.19  18.98  13.70  1.55  1.39 
1909  21.27  19.63  13.88  1.53  1.41 
1910  21.31  20.17  14.22  I .so  I .42 
1911  21.46  20.60  14.39  1.49  I .43 
1912  21.69  20.98  14.85  1.46  1.41 
1913  21.85  21.62  15.21  1.44  1.42 
1914  21.92  22.25  15.28  1.43  1.46 
1915  22. 15  22.35  15.39  I .44  I .45 
1916  23.29  22.60  16.69  1.39  1.35 
1917  24.90  23.21  18.9  I  1.32  I .23 
1918  26.54  25.75  23.66  1.12  I .09 
1919  29.23  31.12  26.94  1.08  1.16 
1920  3 1.69  35.46  33.19  .95  1.07 
1921  30.63  35.96  30.72  1  .oo  1.17 
1922  31.25  35.46  29.40  1.06  1.21 
1923  ‘31.88  35.96  3 1.49  1.01  1.14 
1924  32.85  37.19  32.75  1  .oo  1.14 
1925  34.15  39.44  33.27  1.03  1.19 
1926  34.79  40.92  33.88  1.03  1.21 
Source: For the private industry salary averages, data were assembled from the “all manufacturing” 
data provided in Douglas (1930, 130); building trades (p. 137); coal mining (pp. 143, 162) (be- 
cause combined anthracite and bituminous data begin with 1902, 1900 and 1901 include average 
wages from only bituminous coal mining); railway workers (p. 168); and farm labor (p. 186). The 
relative weights used to calculate the private-sector average are provided on p. 204. 
”Current dollars. 
rebound, beginning approximately in 1920, and postal employees did compar- 
atively better than other federal employees. Federal postal unions organized 
earlier and were able to secure separate legislation for salaries and work rules 
as the twentieth century progres~ed.’~ 
There are other indications of the deterioration in the salary position of fed- 
eral employees. In 1916, the secretary of commerce reported a relative decline 
in the wages of  government clerks that was making it increasingly difficult 
to fill government positions (see Johnson 1940, 25). Data compiled by Mary 
Conyngton on separation rates for federal workers reveal a similar pattern. Vol- 84  Chapter4 
untary separation rates rose from 6.6 percent in 1909, to 12.5 percent in 1913, 
to 19.4 percent by  1917 (Conynton 1920, 15-20). Conyngton claimed that the 
documented rise in voluntary separations from the federal government labor 
force was due primarily to the deterioration in relative salaries of federal em- 
ployees. 
Given the comparative decline in federal salaries in the early twentieth cen- 
tury, federal unions had incentives to lobby for legislation to increase their 
salaries. The National Association of Letter Carriers, the National Federation 
of Federal Employees, and other federal unions actively promoted legislation, 
such as that in 1907, 1920, and 1923 for position reclassifications and opportu- 
nities for higher ~a1aries.I~  These laws, especially the Classification Act  of 
1923, set the stage for gradual wage improvement, and by  1926, Spero could 
claim, most federal employees were paid more than their private-sector coun- 
terparts (Spero 1927, 31). 
In lobbying for salary legislation, federal unions favored automatic salary 
increases and opposed efficiency ratings as a basis for pay  adjustments. The 
president and the Congress, with interests in the effective provision of federal 
services, wanted salaries to reflect productivity, but  such payment schemes 
could be divisive, and they relied on the discretionary actions of  agency offi- 
cials. As a result, federal employee unions had much less incentive to support 
those arrangements. Their generally successful efforts in opposing the wide- 
spread use of  production ratings and supporting more automatic salary in- 
creases again reveal differences in the motivation of employee unions and that 
of the president and the Congress in the development of civil service rules.I6 
The Post Office Department, for example, attempted various standards of 
performance and demerit systems, beginning in 1910, which were opposed by 
federal unions. An example is one initiated in 1916: “Comparative  ratings shall 
be given, on a scale of one hundred on the quantity of work the employees turn 
out. Such ratings shall be based on observations of the employee’s work.. . . 
Clerks and carriers who set the standard for the office with relation to the work 
performed shall be rated one hundred. No employee shall be promoted to the 
$1,200 grade if his rating is less than 90 percent” (Spero 1927, 136-37,  190- 
91, 194). Similarly in 1914, the department attempted to drop the mileage basis 
for compensation for rural mail carriers and to replace it with a productivity 
measure that considered the number of pieces carried, the time required, and 
the weight of  mail. The National Rural Letter Carriers’ Association appealed 
to Congress with a bill defining mandatory salaries on twenty-four-mile routes 
(Spero 1927,200-201).  Across-the-board salary raises of $200 per grade were 
granted by Congress in 1918 (40 Stat. 742), with political pressure exerted by 
the postal  unions to  overcome opposition by  Postmaster General Burleson 
(Spero 1927,203). 
In 1919, the Joint Commission on the Reclassification of Salaries was estab- 
lished to investigate possible salary structures and position classifications for 
the general classified service. One of  the advisory groups consulted by  the 85  The Rise of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
Reclassified Commission was the National Federation of Federal Employees. 
The direct involvement of  federal unions in setting federal employee salaries 
through legislation, as illustrated by  the consultation with the NFFE, became 
an established part of the civil service system. The Reclassification Commis- 
sion, with input from federal labor unions, issued its report in March 1920 (see 
U.S. House of  Representatives 1920) calling for major reclassifications of all 
federal positions (Baruch 1941, 45-50).  This report was criticized by the Bu- 
reau of Efficiency in the executive branch as an infringement on that agency’s 
efforts to promote greater productivity and to lower costs in the federal govern- 
ment. The commission’s recommendations were also opposed in the Senate for 
encouraging higher federal salaries (Spero 1927, 202-7;  Spero 1948, 182-85; 
Van  Riper 1958, 278-79,  296-97).17 
The most important law regarding position classification and salaries for the 
general federal labor force was the Classification Act of  1923 (42 Stat. 1488).’* 
The law  created a Personnel Classification Board with three members, one 
each from the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of  Efficiency, and the 
Bureau of  the Budget. This specific arrangement was opposed by  the NFFE 
because it placed too much power in the hands of the Bureau of Efficiency and 
the Bureau of  the Budget and assisted their efforts to reduce costs. Federal 
unions, however, endorsed the new classification of federal employee positions 
in Washington, D.C., as established by the law. These were gradually extended 
to the field service after 1923 (Baruch 1941, 58-59).  The new position classi- 
fications included the professional and scientific service, the subprofessional 
service, the clerical, administrative, and fiscal service, and the custodial ser- 
vice. Each service was  subdivided into between seven and fourteen grades, 
with a fixed s’alary range for each. The use of efficiency ratings was authorized 
by  the law, but subject to review by  the Personnel Classification Board. This 
was the first major legislation for uniform job positions, salaries, and promo- 
tions in the federal government, goals increasingly desired by  federal unions 
because they  reduced the  discretion available to  agency  heads  and  super- 
visor~.‘~ 
Prior to the passage of the 1923 law, many of the pay increases, especially 
for nonpostal positions, were under either lump-sums appropriations, where 
salary changes would be determined by  department heads, or statutory appro- 
priations, where Congress assigned salary levels to particular positions. But 
department heads determined the duties and qualifications for each position. 
Ismar Baruch notes, “Congress would appropriate a certain lump sum for a 
particular bureau or activity. The administrative official in charge of  that bu- 
reau or activity could then create as many positions as he thought were neces- 
sary at the salaries he considered were necessary. . . .  The salaries of positions 
paid from a lump-sum appropriation could be changed at the will of the execu- 
tive” (1941,34). Under the Classification Act of 1923, salaries were to be fixed 
by  Congress according to uniform definitions of position duties and responsi- 
bilities as outlined by  the Personnel Classification Board (Baruch 1941, 34). 86  Chapter4 
With the  uniform position  structure  defined  by  statute,  unions  could  better 
lobby Congress for general salary increases that would apply broadly to federal 
employees without intervention by the agencies involved. 
4.3.2  Hours of Work 
Not only were federal employees able to raise their salaries by lobbying for 
pay legislation, but they were also able to obtain workplace benefits generally 
ahead of those in the private sector. Indeed, the federal government became a 
model for many of these benefits, and the precedents set at the federal level 
assisted in the spread of  these benefits elsewhere in the economy. This joint 
effect  explains  the  close  collaboration  between  federal  and  private-sector 
unions in lobbying Congress for workplace benefits for federal workers. One 
benefit was the eight-hour day. A shorter workday was one of  the initial de- 
mands of federal employee unions. Since in the late nineteenth century most 
federal employees were in the Post Office Department, and since postal unions 
were the first to organize, the earliest legislation regarding hours of work af- 
fected classified post office employees (Nesbitt 1976, 36-37). 
Among postal workers, letter carriers were particularly well organized, and 
they lobbied Congress for maximum-hours legislation. Letter carriers were not 
covered by the 1868 federal law that limited hours of work for certain laborers, 
workmen, and mechanics, a law that also was not enforced. In their lobbying, 
the letter carriers turned to the Knights of Labor to assist them in pressuring 
Congress. A bill was drafted by the Knights of Labor for an eight-hour work- 
day and sent to Congress in  1886. It was opposed by the Post Office Depart- 
ment, and, although it passed the Senate in June 1886, the bill was not voted 
on'in the House (Spero 1927, 64-68).  The letter carriers remained active in 
pushing for an eight-hour law, and one was reintroduced in Congress in 1888. 
Both the Knights of Labor and the newly organized National Association of 
Letter Carriers arranged demonstrations in support of  the legislation outside 
the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. 
These  lobbying efforts  were  successful. Two laws were  passed,  the  first 
hours-of-work legislation enacted since 1868, one on 30 March 1888 for gov- 
ernment printers (25 Stat. 57), the other on 24 May 1888 for the letter carriers 
(25 Stat. 157).*O Once the legislation was enacted, the National Association of 
Letter Carriers monitored the actions of the Post Office Department in order 
to ensure its compliance. When the department attempted to evade the law, the 
union sued for overtime payment in an action that led to the Supreme Court 
ruling in 1893 in United States  v. Post (148 U.S. 124) that overtime must be 
paid (Spero  1927, 73). These actions enhanced the prestige of the union and 
demonstrated to other federal employees the benefits of membership. 
Congress enacted additional hours-of-work legislation for laborers and me- 
chanics in the government  service in 1892 (27 Stat. 340) and 1912 (37 Stat. 
1  37).*' Broader coverage and more complete restrictions on maximum hours 
for postal employees also were enacted in 1912 as the Reilly Eight-Hour-Day 87  The Rise of Federal Employees as an  Interest Group 
Law (37 Stat. 539) for postal clerks and carriers.22  The legislation was in sec- 
tion 5 of the post office appropriations bill for fiscal year  1913. The law was 
drafted by  the National Association of Post Office Clerks and the  National 
Carriers Association and opposed by the Post Office Department (Spero 1927, 
84). Although the letter carriers had been covered by the 1888 eight-hour law, 
efforts of the Postal Department to evade the law led to action by the carriers’ 
union to obtain clearer legislation that would also provide overtime pay  and 
automatic promotions. The 1912 law, also for the first time, gave postal clerks, 
who organized  unions  later than  the  letter  carriers, eight-hour-day  benefits 
(Spero 1927, 177-80). 
These 1912 laws covering federal employees played  an important  role in 
advancing the eight-hour-day movement elsewhere in the economy in a num- 
ber of ways. First, the laws applied to men and were broader than state legisla- 
tion, which tended to focus either on women and children or on men only in 
specific industries.23  Early state laws, such as those passed in Colorado in 1899 
or in Utah in 1895, for example, applied only to mines and smelters and were 
often  declared unconstitutional  by  state courts.24  State governments  did not 
pass  broad  hours-of-work  legislation  for  government  employees  until  the 
1930s, and general hours legislation from the federal government to cover most 
private employees did not come until the 1938 Fair Labor Standards 
Second, federal legislation  set precedents for the private sector and helped 
create  a  more  favorable  environment  for hours-of-work  restrictions,  which 
were strongly opposed by the National Association of Manufacturers and other 
business groups.2h  Indeed, the AFL backed  legislation  for an eight-hour day 
for federal employees, even though it preferred to negotiate such benefits for 
its members‘in the private sector rather than relying on legislation. As noted 
by Commons, “Special protections for this group was sought, not because of 
any special hazard either for the public or for the workers involved, but because 
of the belief that where the government was the employer, its establishment of 
maximum  hours would be  more readily approved by  the public and by  the 
courts than would laws for other groups. These public works laws, it was be- 
lieved, would then serve as an entering wedge for more legislation  and as an 
example to private employers” (1935, 542).27  For these two reasons, the eight- 
hour day for federal workers was a major aim of the AFL, and its Legislative 
Committee prepared bills and lobbied national political parties and candidates 
for it, beginning in 1902 (Perlman and Taft 1935, 152-57). 
After the federal eight-hour laws were enacted in 1912, there were attempts 
to weaken  their provisions.  These efforts were  strongly resisted by  federal 
unions. The opposition of the National Federation of Federal Employees, the 
Stenographers and Typists Union, and other unions to amendments to appro- 
priations bills to increase the  minimum  daily hours of work of government 
employees in Washington, D.C., sponsored by Representative Borland of Mis- 
souri between  1916 and 1918, illustrates the tactics taken by the unions. Bor- 
land argued that the amendments would “put government employees  on the 88  Chapter4 
same workday basis as workers outside” (Spero 1948, 177). The amendments 
were successfully blocked in 19  16 in committee after an “outpouring” of union 
opposition to the measures in Congress. The amendments were reintroduced 
in 1918 by  Borland, who was running for reelection. Federal unions, assisted 
by the AFL, campaigned against Borland in his Kansas City district by sending 
members and funds to support his opponent. Borland lost, and “for years after- 
ward, in the official magazine and in organizational leaflets, the union waved 
Borland’s political scalp as its prize trophy” (Johnson 1940, 48).** 
4.3.3  Workers’ Compensation Provisions 
Another benefit obtained by federal employees through active political lob- 
bying of Congress for legislation was compulsory workers’ compensation for 
injuries or death due to workplace accidents. As with the eight-hour day, fed- 
eral workers’ compensation provisions came earlier and were more generous 
than those authorized by state governments for their employees or those found 
in the private sector. Federal workers’ compensation legislation also became a 
model for the states, most of  which adopted such legislation after 1910 (see 
Lubove  1967, 263). By  setting the precedent for compulsory compensation 
legislation, the federal government helped demonstrate that such laws  were 
workable. This point was made during 1914 hearings in the House of  Repre- 
sentatives: “There is no doubt but that the people of  this country are com- 
pletely converted to a belief in reasonable compensation legislation and look 
to the federal government to furnish a model system in its relations with its em- 
ployees.”  29 
Indeed, the link between the enactment of workers’ compensation legisla- 
tion by the federal government and its adoption in the private sector was seen 
as a direct one. President Theodore Roosevelt emphasized the leadership role 
of  the federal government during congressional debate on the  1908 federal 
compensation law: “This same broad principle which should apply to the Gov- 
ernment should ultimately be made applicable to all private employers (quoted 
in Nordlund 1991, 5). Further, as extensions to the 1908 law were being con- 
sidered in 1912, Leonard Howland, member of Congress from Ohio, asserted 
that “the Federal Government should be willing to treat its own employees as 
well at least as it proposes to compel industrial enterprises to treat their em- 
ployees” (U.S. House of Representatives 1912b, 10). 
The key  federal workers’ compensation laws were enacted in  1908 and 
1916. The 1908 federal law for compulsory compensation for injury or death, 
along with the 1916 extension for broader coverage, provided models for the 
states that enacted similar legislation between 1911 and 1930 (Paradis 1972, 
212). The 1908 law (35 Stat. 556) provided compensation to artisans or labor- 
ers in manufacturing, arsenals, navy yards, rivers and arid lands construction 
projects, and employees of the Panama Canal Commission for injuries or death 
occurring in the course of  employment. Under the law,  an  employee or his 
survivors received 100 percent of his salary for one year. The law was amended 
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ardous work in forestry and mines. The 1916 federal workers’ compensation 
law-the  Kern-McGillicuddy bill (39 Stat. 742)-applied  to all civilian em- 
ployees of the federal government, and it provided benefits for total disability 
of two-thirds salary, with no time limit, for a maximum of $66.67 per month 
and a minimum of $33.33 per month; for partial disability of two-thirds of the 
employee’s loss in  earning power due to an accident with no time limit on 
payments; and death benefits, depending on the number of beneficiaries, of up 
to two-thirds salary until the children reached age eighteen. Immediate medical 
assistance was also provided, and the waiting period to receive benefits was 
three days. A U.S. Employee’s Compensation Commission was created to ad- 
minister the law (see also Lubove 1967, 263). 
These benefits were considerably more generous than those provided in state 
legislation. Roy Lubove (1967, 269-70)  summarized state compensation laws 
and pointed out that they had limited benefits and low dollar payments to the 
injured or to their survivors. For example, the New Jersey workers’ compensa- 
tion statute of  1911 required a two-week waiting period, authorized a maxi- 
mum payment for total disability of 50 percent of weekly wages up to $10.00 
per week for 400 weeks, provided up to $10.00 per week for 300 weeks for 
partial  disability, and outlined  death benefits of  60 percent of  wages up to 
$10.00 per week for 300 weeks. 
Federal  employee unions  were active in lobbying Congress for workers’ 
compensation  legislation.  An  examination of  the  records of  congressional 
hearings on proposed federal legislation between  1908 and 1916 reveals the 
role of federal unions and related groups, such as the National League of Em- 
ployees of Navy Yards and Arsenals, the National Association of Letter Carri- 
ers, the Federal Civil Service Society, the National Association of Bureau of 
Animal Industry Employees, and others, in promoting the legislation.30 
After enactment of federal legislation  in  1908 and  1916, numerous  state 
workers’ compensation laws followed. In 1921, the U.S. Department of Labor 
described the adoption of workers’ compensation laws and pointed out that the 
federal government led in the enactment of  broad legislation. The first state 
law was adopted in Maryland in 1902, followed by one in Montana in  1909; 
but these laws were for mining only, and the Maryland law was declared uncon- 
~titutional.~’  Table 4.2 outlines the adoption of workers’ compensation legisla- 
tion between  1908 and 1919. It reveals that most of the state legislation came 
between  1911 and 1916, with only six states having no compensation law by 
1921. 
4.3.4  Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
Another benefit obtained by federal employees generally in advance of their 
counterparts in the private sector and in state and local governments was pen- 
sion coverage. Pensions for classified employees were provided by the retire- 
ment law of 22 May 1920, the Sterling-Lehlbach Act (41 Stat. 614). The law 
was enacted after considerable lobbying by federal unions and was considered 
model legislation for adoption by the states. Retirement provisions became an 90  Chapter4 
Table 4.2  Enactment of General Workers’ Compensation Legislation 


























































































Source: U.S. Department of  Commerce and Labor (1921, 13). 
aim of federal employees after 1890, and, beginning in 1900, every session of 
Congress considered at least one bill to provide for pensions for the federal 
civilian labor force. Postal unions were active in campaigning for retirement 
provisions, and they periodically worked to defeat those members of Congress 
who opposed the legislation (Spero 1927,270-83). Additionally, the U.S. Civil 
Service Retirement Association and the National Association of Civil Service 
Employees were formed, in part, to lobby for federal retirement legi~lation.~~ 
Congressional debate between 1900 and 1920 over federal pension provisions 
centered on the government’s share of pension contributions and whether the 
federal government should assume new financial commitments of this scale.33 
Federal unions maintained pressure on Congress. By  1912, the Republican 
party platform endorsed pensions for civil service employees, and the Demo- 
cratic party followed suit in its  1916 presidential platform (see U.S. Senate 
19  18,5). The U.S. Civil Service Retirement Association, the National Associa- 
tion of  Civil Service Employees, and the Letter Carriers Association joined 
forces to organize the Joint Conference on Retirement, which successfully lob- 
bied Congress for passage of the 1920 retirement law. Other organizations sup- 
porting the legislation included the Railway Mail Association, the National 
Federation of  Federal Employees, and the National Federation of  Postal Em- 
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Part of the support of Congress for federal pension legislation was based on 
an efficiency drive following World War I. With tenure for civil servants, the 
federal government had accumulated a large number of older employees who 
were perceived to be less productive than younger workers.  Pension benefits 
were viewed as a means of encouraging their retirement (see U.S. Senate 1918, 
5; U.S. Senate 1919a, 3). Under the law, all classified civil service employees 
qualified for a pension after reaching age seventy and rendering at least fifteen 
years of service. Mechanics, letter carriers, and post office clerks (the most 
organized employees) were eligible for a pension after reaching age sixty-five, 
and railway mail clerks were eligible at age sixty-two. The ages at which em- 
ployees qualified were also mandatory retirement ages, although an employee 
could be retained for two years beyond the mandatory age if the department 
head and the head of the Civil Service Commission approved. All eligible em- 
ployees  were required  to contribute  2.5 percent  of their salaries toward the 
payment of pensions. Pension benefits were determined by the number of years 
of service. Those who had served thirty  or more years (class A employees) 
could receive 60 percent of their average annual salary during the last ten years 
of service. On the other hand, those who had more than fifteen years of service 
but fewer than eighteen years of service (class F employees) could receive 30 
percent of their average annual salary during the last ten years of service.35 
The 1920 Federal Retirement Act was considerably more generous than ei- 
ther state government or private pension provisions at the time. When the act 
was passed, only Massachusetts had a civil service retirement plan, which had 
been adopted in 191  1  .36 The Massachusetts plan required all employees to con- 
tribute up to 5’percent of their salaries to a pension trust. Retirement was pos- 
sible at age sixty and mandatory at age seventy. At retirement, the state pur- 
chased  an  annuity  in  the  retiree’s  name  equal  to twice  the  value  of  the 
employee’s accumulated c~ntribution.~’  This amounted to 50 percent of each 
employee’s pension. The federal government’s contribution under the 1920 law, 
however, was approximately 67 percent.38  Similarly, there were fewer than 300 
nonfarm, private-sector pension plans in the United States in 1920. These plans 
covered around  10 percent of the civilian labor force, but the lack of funding 
and tight vesting restrictions meant that only a small portion of those workers 
ever received a retirement benefit.39  Few private-sector plans matched the fed- 
eral government’s minimum pensions  of  from $180 (class F employees) to 
$360 (class A employees) for comparable years of service.4o 
4.4  Summary 
In chapters 2 and 3, we emphasized the roles of the president and the Con- 
gress in the establishment and subsequent modification of the federal civil ser- 
vice system. Even so, there are other important attributes of the civil service 
system that are not so clearly in the interest of the president or the Congress. 
Relatively high salaries for lower-level employees, a compressed salary distri- 
bution compared with the private sector, near automatic promotions, and strict 92  Chapter4 
tenure rules are attributes of  the current federal civil service system. Under- 
standing why they were added requires going beyond the president and the 
Congress to an investigation of the role played by federal employee unions in 
lobbying for legislation in their interest. Indeed, automatic promotions, rather 
than those based on efficiency ratings, were at first opposed by the president 
and the Congress. As we point out early in this chapter, the creation of  the 
merit system helped unite an otherwise fragmented federal civilian labor force. 
As the classified share of federal employees increased, more and more of these 
federal workers began to view themselves as distinct groups with a long-term 
interest in their jobs and labor contracts. The outcome was the rise of federal 
employee unions after 1883. 
Federal employees became active in lobbying Congress for legislation rec- 
ognizing the right to join unions and to lobby Congress without penalty  of 
dismissal (Lloyd-LaFollette Act). They worked to raise their salaries, which 
had declined compared to those in the private sector after 1883. After  1920, 
the relative deterioration of federal salaries was reversed. Through other legis- 
lation, federal employees obtained additional workplace benefits before their 
private-sector counterparts, including the eight-hour day, comparatively liberal 
workers’ compensation coverage, and more extensive pension provisions. 
We have emphasized that, in their lobbying efforts, federal employee unions 
received important support, first, from the Knights of Labor and, later, from 
the AFL and other organized labor groups because the benefits received by 
federal workers could set useful precedents for other labor markets. Some fed- 
eral unions were part of the AFL, such as the National Federation of Federal 
Employees and the National Federation of Post Office Clerks, so that coordina- 
tion was natural. In addition, after 1905, the AFL began to look to legislation 
as a means, along with traditional contract negotiations, to advance the general 
goals of organized labor (Weinstein 1967, 159-65).  Lobbying for legislation 
affecting federal employees became part of a broader legislative initiative of 
the AFL. 
In the following chapters, we examine the further modification of the federal 
civil  service system after  1930 by  the president,  the Congress, and federal 
unions. We conjecture as to why the lobbying efforts of  federal employees 
appear to have been so successful, directing the development of the civil ser- 
vice system in ways beneficial to their interests. 
Notes 
1. Indeed, an understanding of the process of institutional change requires a recog- 
nition that, as relative prices change, new parties will be attracted to and seek to mold 
an institution to suit their needs. For an interesting study of how sugar import controls 
induced new interest groups (corn growers) and technology (corn sweeteners) with as 93  The Rise of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
much at stake in the regulation as the original parties (domestic sugar growers and 
processors), see Krueger (1991). 
2. The president and members of Congress, as well as some voters, may have fore- 
seen the short-term effects of the civil service system as it was being assembled. But 
we are examining institutional development over a 100-year period, and politicians con- 
cerned with reelection  necessarily focused their attention on short-term factors that 
affected critical constituents. These politicians had little incentive to follow the much 
longer-term development of the civil service system. 
3. Johnson comments, “No motivation of civil service unions is stronger than the 
desire to maintain and extend the merit system. In some cases, where jobs are unstable 
and unclassified, union activity takes the form of maneuvering for new projects, trans- 
fers, or reemployment lists, all for the purpose of preserving employment. But in most 
cases union efforts are directed toward maintenance of the merit system where it now 
applies and extension of it to practically all exempted areas. .  . . Relative to spoils, unor- 
ganized employees have to some extent taken over the watch-dog functions performed 
by the civil service reform groups” (1  940, 38). 
4. Johnson (1940, 23-26)  argues that federal unions played a critical role in the 
development of civil service legislation and practices. In a more contemporary setting, 
Freeman (1986,42) argues that public unions rely more on political influence than do 
private unions. They are both employees and voters and, hence, can influence the de- 
mand for government services. 
5. U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, 1103). For discussion of the political activ- 
ity of federal employee unions, see Johnson (1940,27-37). 
6. The salary grades were $600, $800, $900, $1,000, $1,100, and $1,200. Automatic 
promotions  were authorized through $900 at second-class post  offices and through 
$1,000 at first-class post offices. 
7. During debate on the legislation in the second session of the Sixty-second Con- 
gress, the Senate did insert an antistrike provision because of its concern that union 
membership might lead to strikes by government employees. 
8. Clerks and carriers were divided into five grades from $1,400 to $1,800 annually 
with $100 increments between them. This act is discussed in more detail later in the 
text. 
9. For a detailed discussion of the pay  schedules in effect during the period both 
before and after the passage of the Pendleton Act, see Baruch (1941). 
10. An  observed pattern of  deterioration in the relative salary position of federal 
workers in the early period of  the merit system is inconsistent with Horn’s  (1988) dis- 
cussion of the motivation for civil service rules. Although Horn briefly examines the 
origins of the civil service system, he argues that the relatively high salaries and tenure 
protection  currently observed for federal employees are reflections of  an  efficiency 
wage. According to Horn’s  agency explanation for civil service rules, Congress would 
provide high salaries in order to maintain and motivate the federal labor force. This, 
however, does not appear to have been the case during the initial forty years of the civil 
service system, when federal salaries seem to have declined compared to the private 
sector. Further, as we outline here and in subsequent chapters, the subsequent rise in 
federal salaries owes more to the lobbying activities of federal unions than to a desire 
of Congress to provide an efficiency wage. 
1  1. For discussion of the decline in the relative wage of federal employees and associ- 
ated problems of retention, see also Van Riper (1958, 243). 
12. Unskilled labor is not included in the averages for either the private sector of the 
government. Although Douglas provides wage day information for unskilled workers in 
various industry groups, there are no comparable data for the federal government sector. 
13. Only farm laborers did not outpace federal employees (see Douglas 1930, 130, 
137, 162, 168, 186, 193). 94  Chapter4 
14. Spero (1927) describes the actions of  postal unions and specific classification 
and wage legislation obtained by them. Van Riper (1958, 273-74)  points to the success 
of federal postal unions in obtaining special legislation to address their demands. On the 
other hand, general federal employee unions organized later and were not as aggressive. 
15. For a summary of  pay  legislation, see U.S.  House of  Representatives (1931). 
Johnson (1940,44) discusses the role of the NFFE in the enactment of the Classification 
Act of  1923. The actions of postal unions in particular are discussed in the text. 
16. Van Riper (1958, 247) notes that the use of service ratings as a basis for promo- 
tion was very limited. He claims that this was because such ratings were difficult to 
implement and does not mention the opposition of federal unions to the use of effi- 
ciency ratings. 
17. In the Senate, Senator Reed Smoot of Utah led the criticism of the Reclassifica- 
tion  Committee’s report.  For  discussion  of  the  Bureau  of  Efficiency,  see  Baruch 
( 194  I, 38-44). 
18. For discussion, see Baruch (1941, 50-59). 
19. Already department heads were beginning to complain about their inability to 
implement new  work rules and pay for productivity. See statements by  James Davis, 
secretary of  labor, and Attorney General Harry Daugherty in Davis, Daugherty, and 
Work (1923). 
20. Dankert, Mann, and Northrup state that “agitatation for enforcement of legisla- 
tion covering federal employees led to the 1888 eight-hour day law for workers in the 
Government Printing Office and the Post Office Department” (1965,45). 
21. The latter required that contracts between the U.S. government and laborers or 
mechanics be limited to eight hours. Penalties were outlined. 
22. Section 5 provided that, after 4 March  1913, letter carriers in the city delivery 
service and clerks at first- and second-class post offices would work a maximum of 
eight hours a day. 
23. In testimony regarding the proposed Fair Labor Standards Act, Lucy Mason, 
general secretary of  National Consumers League, stated that only eleven states had 
eight,hour-day legislation and that most laws applied only to women (see U.S. Senate 
1937, 403). Goldin (1988, 1990) argues that state legislation enacted after 1914 defin- 
ing the maximum hours of work for women generally had a minimal effect on the actual 
hours worked and that it also tended to apply equally to men. 
24. For a summary of state efforts prior to 1912, see U.S. House of Representatives 
(1912a, 8-10).  Commons (1935, 542) ends a summary of  state legislation with the 
conclusion that it was fragmentary and generally not effective. 
25. Dankert, Mann, and Northrup (1965,6) claim that hours of work per week in the 
private, nonagricultural sector did not decline to around forty hours until 1940. They 
also assert (p. 45) that there was little action by  state governments to provide general 
hours legislation until  1933. For discussion of the lag by  the states in passing hours 
limits for men  in public works between  1914 and  1932, see also Commons (1935, 
547, 558). 
26. As evidence of  a more favorable environment, state legislation setting hours of 
work was sustained by the Supreme Court in  1917 (243 U.S. 426, Bunting decision; 
Dankert, Mann, and Northrup  1965, 47). More boldly, Paradis (1972, 64) claims that 
the eight-hour day gathered momentum after the federal government’s 1912 laws. For 
discussion of the important role of federal legislation in the hours-of-work movement, 
see also Cahill (1968, 82) and Commons and Andrews (1936, 119). 
27. For similar comments, see Dankert, Mann, and Northrup (1965, 51). 
28. For discussion, see Spero (1948, 176-81). 
29. Testimony by Henry R. Seager, president of the American Association for Labor 
Legislation (see U.S. House of Representatives  1914. 10). Also, Lubove argues that 95  The Rise of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
“considerable impetus to the compensation movement came from the enactment of the 
federal law in  1908, which had been strongly endorsed by President Theodore Roose- 
velt” (1967, 263). See also U.S. House of Representatives (1914, 10). 
30. For example, during the  1914 hearings in the House of  Representatives (U.S. 
House of  Representatives 1914) on a workers’ compensation bill, testimony was given 
by  William E. Russell, president of the Federal Civil Service Society; S.  J. Walkley, 
secretary of the National Association of Bureau of Animal Industry Employees; Edward 
J. Cantwell, national secretary of the National Association of Letter Carriers; Edward 
J. Gainer, president of  the National Association of  Letter Carriers: Frank J. Rogers, 
president of the United National Association of Post Office Clerks: and Arthur Holder, 
legislative committeeman of  the AFL. All testified in favor of  legislation to provide 
automatic compensation for civilian employees of the federal government for death or 
serious accident. This ultimately was provided in  1916. Additional discussion of the 
role that employee groups and unions played in the workers’ compensation movement 
is provided in Weinstein (1967). 
3  1. For additional discussion of early state legislation and the role played by federal 
laws, see Weinstein (1967), Lubove (1967), and Paradis (1972, 212). 
32. One of the reasons that it took until 1920 for legislation to be passed was that the 
lobbyists promoted different kinds of  retirement provisions. The U.S. Civil Service 
Retirement Association favored a contributory system, while the National Association 
of Civil Service Employees promoted pension legislation with more significant govern- 
ment contributions. 
33. Numerous hearings were held between 1900 and 1920 on federal pensions (see, 
e.g., U.S. House of  Representatives 1912c: and U.S. Senate 1919a). 
34. For testimony, political support, and a history of federal retirement legislation, 
see US.  Senate (1918, 1919a). 
35. The coverage of the law, including payments by class of worker and contribution 
schemes, is outlined in US.  Senate (1918, 1919a). 
36. For a summary of city retirement plans in the United States, most of which were 
either disability plans or entirely funded by  the workers, see “Civil Service Retire- 
ment” (1916). 
37. The Massachusetts plan was considered by  Congress for possible adoption in 
1912 (see US. House of Representatives 1912c, 66-76). 
38. This is estimated by Epstein (1928, 168). 
39. For discussions of private-sector pension conditions, see Epstein (1928,  160), 
Epstein (1933, 148), and Craig (1992). 
40. For a review of contemporary private-sector pension plans, see Conyngton (1926, 
21-56).  See also Brooks (1971, 305), who argues that pensions and vacations were 
established in government employment long before becoming  commonplace in pri- 
vate employment. 